Abstract. A significant effort has recently been made to rigorously relate the formal treatment of cryptography with the computational one. A first substantial step in this direction was taken by Abadi and Rogaway [AR02] . Considering a formal language that treats symmetric encryption, [AR02] show that an associated formal semantics is sound with respect to an associated computational semantics, under a particular, sufficient, condition on the computational encryption scheme. In this paper, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for completeness, tightly characterizing this aspect of the exposition. Our condition involves the ability to distinguish a ciphertext and the key it was encrypted with, from a ciphertext and a random key. It is shown to be strictly weaker than a previously suggested condition for completeness (confusion-freedom of Micciancio and Warinschi [MW02]), and should be of independent interest.
Introduction
Modern cryptography has been investigated from both a formal and a computational perspective. Of the former, a typical treatment features a formal language, in which statements, representing cryptographic entities and operations, can be made. Their security properties are usually stated outside the language, captured in operations that manipulate the formal statements, or expressed with additional formal constructs. Of the latter, a typical treatment uses algorithms on strings of bits to model cryptographic operations. Security properties are defined in terms of probability and computational complexity of successful attacks.
Recently, an effort has been made to relate the two approaches, traditionally considered separately and mostly by different communities. A successful attempt holds the promise of bringing the strengths of one treatment to the other. From one direction, it is expected to quantify and highlight implicit assumptions of formal semantics. In addition, it should confirm and increase the relevance of formal proofs to concrete computational instantiations. From the other direction, the establishment of such connections may allow the application of high level formal reasoning mechanisms to the computational domain.
A first step in this direction was taken by Abadi and Rogaway [AR02] . Focusing on symmetric encryption, their work is based on a formal language that includes constructs to represent bits, keys and an encryption operation. Two semantics are defined for the language. In the first, an expression in the language is associated with a syntactic counterpart, the pattern, which mirrors the expression up to parts that should look unintelligible to a viewer (informally, parts that are encrypted with keys that are not recoverable from the expression). Expressions are said to be equivalent in this setting if their patterns are equal (up to key renaming). This constitutes a formal semantics. In the second definition, an expression is associated with an ensemble of distributions on strings, obtained by instantiating its encryption construct with a concrete computational encryption scheme with different security parameters. Two expressions are said to be indistinguishable in this setting if their associated ensembles are computationally indistinguishable. This constitutes a computational semantics. Under this framework, [AR02] give a soundness result: they show that under specific, sufficient, conditions on the computational encryption scheme, equivalence of expressions in the formal semantics implies their indistinguishability in the computational semantics.
Our Results. In this paper, we tightly characterize the completeness aspect of this exposition. We identify a necessary and sufficient condition on the computational encryption scheme under which indistinguishability in the computational setting implies equivalence in the formal one. For any two expressions, our condition involves the admittance of an efficient test that distinguishes a ciphertext and the key it was encrypted with, from a ciphertext and some random key, with a noticeable (i.e., non-negligible) probability, when the plaintexts are drawn from the ensembles associated with those expressions. An encryption scheme that satisfies this requirement is said to admit weak key-authenticity tests for expressions. The result is obtained using a new proof technique, featuring a fixpoint characterization of formal equivalence.
In the literature [MW02, AJ01] , the notion of confusion-freedom was previously proposed as sufficient for completeness. Informally, a confusion-free encryption scheme is one in which the decryption of a ciphertext with a wrong key fails with almost certainty. The above-mentioned work suggests the use of a full-fledged authenticated encryption scheme [BN00,KY00] to achieve this notion. We compare confusion-freedom with a strengthened version of the notion of the admittance of weak key-authenticity tests for expressions, that involves the admittance of a single, all-purpose, weak key-authenticity test, defined purely in computational terms. Such test is referred to as a weak key-authenticity test. We show that the requirement that an encryption scheme admits a weak keyauthenticity test is strictly weaker than the requirement that it be confusion-free (and certainly weaker than the requirement that it be an authenticated encryption scheme). To that effect, we present a simple encryption scheme that admits a weak key-authenticity test but is not confusion-free. The scheme thus matches our completeness criterion, but not that of [MW02] . Furthermore, it meets the soundness criterion of [AR02] .
The notion of the weak key authenticity should be of independent interest. As a primitive, it relates to the absence of a weak version of key-anonymity [BB01] and which-key revealing [AR02] properties. It would be interesting to investigate ways of meeting it, other than the ones presented here, and explore its practical uses.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we revisit the formal treatment of symmetric encryption of [AR02] , and give a fixpoint characterization of the "reachable parts" of expressions. In section 3, we discuss the computational treatment of symmetric encryption, and revisit the computational semantics for expressions of [AR02] . In section 4, we give our main completeness result for schemes that admit weak key-authenticity tests for expressions. In section 5, we present the strengthened version of the test and compare it with other cryptographic notions; in particular, we show that the admittance of a weak keyauthenticity test is a weaker property of an encryption scheme than it being confusion-free. The proof demonstrates a method of achieving the admittance of a weak key-authenticity test.
Formal Treatment of Symmetric Encryption, Formal Semantics for Expressions
In this section, we revisit the formal treatment of symmetric encryption of [AR02] . That treatment consists of a formal language and a formal semantics. Our goal is to recast the definitions of [AR02] in terms that pertain closely to the tree structure of expressions in the language. In addition, we provide an alternative, fixpoint characterization of the "reachable parts" of expressions, that plays an important role in the proof of our completeness result.
A Formal Language for Symmetric Encryption
Let Bits be the set {0, 1}. Let Keys be a fixed, non-empty set of symbols, disjoint from Bits. The elements of Bits and Keys are referred to as bits and keys, respectively. Following the work of [AR02], we let our formal language, denoted by Exp, be a set of expressions, defined inductively as follows:
1. bits and keys are expressions. They are referred to as atomic expressions, or simply atoms. 2. (a) If M and N are expressions, then so is (M, N ). We say that (M, N ) is directly derived from M and N ; it is non-atomic. (b) If M is an expression and K is a key, then {M } K is an expression. We say that {M } K is is directly derived from M ; it is non-atomic too.
Parts 2a and 2b of the above definition are called derivation rules. Informally, (M, N ) represents the pairing of expressions M and N ; {M } K represents the encryption of expression M with key K. Expressions are strings of symbols. The length of an expression E is the number of symbols it is comprised of (count '} K ' as a single symbol), and is denoted by |E|. We use E 1 = E 2 to denote that the expressions E 1 , E 2 are identical as strings of symbols.
It is important to note that every non-atomic expression can be associated with a unique rule and a unique set of expressions from which it is directly derived. Expressions in Exp are consequently said to be uniquely readable. The converse holds too. Formally, two non-atomic expressions E 1 , E 2 ∈ Exp are identical as strings of symbols iff either
For a proof, see the full version of this paper [HG03] .
The structure of an expression can be represented naturally in the form of a tree. A derivation tree T E for an expression E is defined inductively as follows:
1. If E is atomic, then T E consists of a single node, the root, labelled by E. 2. If E is non-atomic, then T E consists of a single node, the root, labelled by E, and an ordered list of trees for the expressions from which E is directly derived; the sets of nodes of these trees are disjoint, and none contains the root of T E . If E = (M, N ), we say that T M and T N are the left and right subtrees of T E , respectively. The roots of T M and T N are said to be the left and right children of the root of T E , respectively. Similarly, if E = {M } K then T M is said to be the subtree of T E ; the root of T M is said to be the child of the root of T E .
Informally, the notion of a derivation tree resembles that of the standard parse tree; the two relate in that a node in a derivation tree is labelled with the yield of the corresponding node in the parse tree. We let |T E | denote the cardinality of the set of nodes of T E . We mention two properties of expressions and their derivation trees that are relevant to our treatment. First, two expressions are identical as strings of symbols iff their respective derivation trees are identical; to see this, apply the unique readability property of expressions and its converse inductively to the structure of the derivation trees. Second, if |E| = n, then T E consists of at most n nodes; this can be shown by induction on the length of an expression.
Formal Semantics for Expressions
In defining a formal semantics for Exp, we seek to capture a notion of privacy, intuitively associated with the encryption operation. In particular, we would like to express our understanding that parts of expressions, representing encryptions with keys that are not recoverable from the text, are unintelligible (or unreachable) to a viewer. We would also like to capture our understanding that expressions, differing only in their unintelligible parts, "look the same" to a viewer. Just as in [AR02] , we do so by mapping each expression to a syntactic counterpart, the pattern, which mirrors only its reachable parts. We then define equivalence of expressions in terms of their respective patterns. We state our definitions in terms of functions on derivation trees of expressions and patterns, rather than in the form of procedures on expressions and patterns, as is done in [AR02] .
Let T E be the derivation tree of an expression E, let V be its node set and r ∈ V its root. A set U ⊆ V is said to contain the reachable nodes of T E if: 
For E ∈ Exp of length n, T E consists of at most n nodes, of which there are at most 2 n subsets. It follows that the number of sets containing the set of reachable nodes of T E is finite. Let R be the intersection of all those sets. It is easy to show that R itself contains the set of reachable nodes of T E ; it is minimal in the sense that it is contained in all such sets. We call R the set of reachable nodes of T E . Informally, reachable nodes correspond to parts of an expression that should be intelligible to a viewer.
Let T E be a derivation tree with a root r and a set of reachable nodes R. The graph induced by T E on R must be a tree rooted at r, and not a forest (otherwise, let R be the set of nodes in the connected component that contains r; R is a set that contains the set of reachable nodes in T E , contradicting the minimality of R). We call this tree the tree of reachable nodes, and use T R E to denote it.
The definition of a pattern extends that of an expression with the addition of an atomic symbol, 2. Informally, 2 will appear in parts of a pattern that correspond to unintelligible parts of the associated expression.
Let Pat be the set of patterns, defined inductively as follows:
1. bits, keys and the symbol 2 are (atomic) patterns.
(a) If
As with expressions, we associate a pattern P with a derivation tree T P . Two patterns are identical as strings of symbols iff their respective derivation trees are identical.
To map expressions to patterns via their respective derivation trees, we will need an appropriate notion of tree isomorphism. Let T 1 , T 2 be finite, rooted, ordered trees with node sets V 1 , V 2 and roots r 1 ∈ V 1 , r 2 ∈ V 2 , respectively. T 1 , T 2 are said to be isomorphic as rooted, ordered trees if there exists a bijection ϕ : V 1 → V 2 such that:
ϕ is said to be an isomorphism of T 1 , T 2 as rooted, ordered trees.
Let T E be the derivation tree of an expression E, V E its node set, R ⊆ V E its set of reachable nodes. Let T P be the derivation tree of a pattern P , V P its node set. We say that expression E has a pattern P if there exists a ϕ : R → V P such that: 
The corresponding definition of [AR02] amounts to a walk of T R E and T P that enforces the above constraints.
We note that the pattern P associated with each expression E is unique. To see this, notice that the uniqueness of T E implies a unique set of reachable nodes R, which implies a unique T R E , which is mapped to a unique T P , which, in turn, guarantees a unique P . The converse is not true, however; every pattern has infinitely many expressions that are mapped to it.
We proceed with the notion of expression equivalence. Informally, we require that the derivation trees of patterns corresponding to equivalent expressions be isomorphic up to key renaming. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let P i be the pattern of expression E i , with a derivation tree T Pi over V Pi . We say that E 1 is equivalent to E 2 , and write E 1 ∼ = E 2 , iff there exists a ϕ : V P1 → V P2 and a permutation σ on Keys such that:
Composing the above definitions, we obtain the following property of the equivalence relation.
Theorem 2.1. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let E i be an expression with a derivation tree T Ei , a set of reachable nodes R Ei and an induced tree of reachable nodes T R Ei . Then E 1 ∼ = E 2 iff there exist a ϕ : R E1 → R E2 and a permutation σ on Keys such that:
The proof, mostly technical, appears in the full version of this paper [HG03] . We conclude with a brief discussion of some ramifications of the formal semantics we have seen in this section. We observe that under the above definitions, the encryption operator:
-"Preserves privacy", as seen in the equivalence {0} K ∼ = {1} K . Informally, a ciphertext conceals the underlying plaintext.
Informally, an adversary, given two ciphertexts, cannot tell whether their underlying plaintexts are identical or not. -"Conceals key repetitions", as seen in the equivalence ({0} K1 , {1} K1 ) ∼ = ({0} K7 , {1} K8 ). Informally, an adversary, given two ciphertexts, cannot tell whether they were generated with the same encryption key or not. -"Conceals plaintext length", as seen in the equivalence
Informally, the ciphertext conceals the length of the underlying plaintext.
The definitions of semantics can be modified to accommodate relaxations of the above properties. For example, the semantics can be made sensitive to different plaintext lengths, by introducing an atomic pattern symbol 2 n for each size n and modifying the definition of equivalence appropriately. We stress that the results of [AR02] and ours can be modified to tolerate such changes.
A Fixpoint Characterization of the Set of Reachable Nodes
The set of reachable nodes was defined in the previous section in set-intersection terms. Here, we give an alternative characterization that plays an important role in the proof of our completeness result. We show that for an expression E, the set of reachable nodes of T E is the least fixpoint of an associated operator, O E . In addition, we show that this fixpoint can be achieved by an iterative application of the operator, no more than a polynomial (in the size of E) number of times. The reader is referred to the full version of this paper [HG03] for a full account.
Let S be a finite set, and let 2 S be the set of all subsets of S.
A is said to be the least fixpoint of O, and is denoted lfp(O), if A is a fixpoint of O and for all fixpoints B of O, A ⊆ B. The powers of O are defined as follows:
Consider an expression E with a derivation tree T E over a set of nodes V E with a root r E ∈ V E . Let O E : 2 V E → 2 V E be defined as follows: N ) with a left child u in TE (labelled M ); or (c) ∃v ∈ A labelled (M, N ) with a right child u in TE (labelled N ); or (d) ∃v ∈ A labelled {M }K with a child u in TE (labelled M ) and ∃w ∈ A labelled K.
We prove the following: . Let E be an expression of length n, T E its derivation tree over V E , R E ⊆ V E the set of reachable nodes. Then there exists an i ∈ N,
Computational Treatment of Symmetric Encryption, Computational Semantics for Expressions
In this section, we describe a computational treatment of symmetric encryption: we define an encryption scheme, discuss a relevant notion of security, and review methods of achieving such a notion under standard assumptions. The discussion is similar to the one in [AR02] , and may be skipped without significant damage. We then use a computational encryption scheme to define a semantics for the language of expressions of subsection 2.1, recasting the corresponding definition of [AR02] in terms of the derivation trees of expressions.
Computational Treatment of Symmetric Encryption
Let {0, 1} * denote the set of all finite binary strings and let |x| denote the length of x ∈ {0, 1}
* . An encryption scheme Π = (K, E, D) with a security parameter η ∈ N consists of three polynomial-time algorithms, as follows:
-K, the key generation algorithm, is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter η ∈ N (provided in unary-denoted by 1 η ) and returns a key k ∈ {0, 1} * . We write k R ← K(1 η ), thinking of k as being drawn from the probability distribution induced by K(1 η ) on {0, 1} * . When used as a set, we let K(1 η ) denote the support of that distribution. -E, the encryption algorithm, is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a key k ∈ K(1 η ) for some η ∈ N and a plaintext x ∈ {0, 1} * and returns a ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1} * ∪{⊥}. As before, we write c R ← E k (x), thinking of c as being drawn from the probability distribution induced by E k (x) on {0, 1} * . When used as a set, we let E k (x) denote the support of that distribution.
It is common for encryption schemes to restrict the set of strings they are willing to encrypt; having the encryption algorithm return ⊥ is intended to capture such restrictions. We make two requirements. First, we insist that for a given η ∈ N, a plaintext x ∈ {0, 1} * is either restricted or not, that is, for all
We use Plain Π[η] to denote the set of unrestricted plaintexts, for any η ∈ N. Second, we require that for any η ∈ N, if x ∈ {0, 1} * is not restricted, then all x ∈ {0, 1} * of the same length are unrestricted. In addition, we insist that the length of a ciphertext c ∈ E k (x) depend only on η and |x| when k ∈ K(1 η ), for any x and η. -D, the decryption algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm that takes a key k ∈ K(1 η ) for some η ∈ N and a ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1} * and returns some x ∈ {0, 1} * ∪ {⊥}. We write x ← D k (c). Having the decryption algorithm output ⊥ is intended to reflect a rejection of the given ciphertext.
We require that Π be correct; that is, for all η ∈ N, for all k ∈ K(1 η ) and for
A Notion of Security. We consider a variation of the standard notion of indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA security, for short) of [GM84, BD97] . Informally, the strengthened version "conceals key repetitions" and "conceals message lengths", as discussed in subsection 2.2. This is necessary for a soundness result (see [AR02] for additional motivation).
Recall that a function : N → R is negligible if for every constant c ∈ N there exists an η c such that for all η > η c , (η) ≤ η −c . Let Π = (K, E, D) be an encryption scheme, η ∈ N a security parameter and A an adversary with access to two oracles (denoted A (·),(·) ). Define:
where E k (·) is an oracle that returns c Pseudorandom Function Families and Achieving Type-0 Security. Given a set S, let x R ← S denote the sampling of x from S endowed with a uniform distribution.
Let η ∈ N, l, L be polynomials, Func l(η)→L(η) the set of all functions from
family of functions indexed by {0, 1}
η , and A an adversary with access to an oracle (denoted A (·) ). Define:
where F k (·) is an oracle that returns F k (x) on input x, and f (·) is an oracle that returns f (x) on input x. We say that F is pseudorandom [GG86] if for every probabilistic, polynomial time adversary A, Adv prf
F [η] (A) is negligible (as a function of η).
Pseudorandom function families are commonly used in computational cryptography as building blocks for encryption schemes, as in the CBC and CTR modes. In [BD97] , it is shown that these modes are IND-CPA secure when using an underlying pseudorandom family of functions. In [AR02] , the authors describe how these results extend to achieve Type-0 security. See the mentioned references for more details.
Computational Semantics for Expressions
In this section, we define a computational semantics for the language of expressions of section 2.1. We first associate an expression with an ensemble of distributions over {0, 1}
* , resulting each from the "instantiation" of the expression with a concrete computational encryption scheme with a particular security parameter. We then define expression indistinguishability in terms of the indistinguishability of associated ensembles.
Let E be an expression, T E its derivation tree over V E , Keys E the set of key symbols appearing in E (that is, atomic keys and keys from derivations of the form {·} K ). Let Π = (K, E, D) be an encryption scheme with a security parameter η ∈ N. For x 1 , . . . , x k ∈ {0, 1} * and a tag t from some finite, fixed set of tags, let x 1 , . . . , x k , t denote an (arbitrary, fixed, unambiguous, polynomial-time) encoding of x 1 , . . . , x k , t as a string over {0, 1}
* . Define the following procedure: 
Let [[E]] Π(η) denote the probability distribution induced by Sample
We write x R ← D to indicate that x is sampled from a distribution D. To make our forthcoming definitions robust, we require that Π is such that for every expression E, there exists an η E ∈ N such that for all η ≥ η E and e
For i ∈ {1, 2}, let D i = {D i (η)} η∈N be probability distribution ensembles, A an algorithm. Define:
We say that D 1 , D 2 are indistinguishable, and write D 1 ≈ D 2 , if for every probabilistic, polynomial time algorithm A, Adv ind D1(η),D2(η) (A) is negligible (as a function of η).
Let E 1 , E 2 be expressions. We say that E 1 , E 2 are indistinguishable, and write
Weak Key-Authenticity Tests for Expressions, Semantic Completeness
The soundness result of Abadi and Rogaway states that for acyclic expressions 3 E 1 , E 2 and a Type-0 encryption scheme Π,
Here, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for completeness, tightly characterizing this aspect of the exposition. For any two acyclic expressions, the condition involves the admittance of an efficient test that distinguishes a ciphertext and the key it was encrypted with, from a ciphertext and some random key, with a noticeable probability, when the plaintexts are drawn from the ensembles associated with those expressions. Formally: Definition 4.1 (Weak Key-Authenticity Test for Expressions). Let Π = (K, E, D) be an encryption scheme with a security parameter η ∈ N, let E 1 , E 2 be acyclic expressions, A an algorithm. Define:
We say that Π admits a weak key-authenticity test for E 1 , E 2 (WKA-EXP-(E 1 , E 2 ) test, for short), if there exists a probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithm A such that Adv
is non-negligible (as a function of η). We say that Π admits weak key-authenticity tests for expressions (WKA-EXP tests, for short), if for all acyclic expressions E 1 and E 2 , Π admits a weak key-authenticity test for E 1 , E 2 .
Our main result is the following: Theorem 4.2 (The admittance of WKA-EXP tests is necessary and sufficient for completeness). Let Π = (K, E, D) be an encryption scheme. Then for all acyclic expressions E 1 and E 2 , E 1 Π ≈ E 2 implies E 1 ∼ = E 2 iff Π admits weak key-authenticity tests for expressions.
We begin by proving the necessity part. Let E 1 , E 2 be two acyclic expressions. Consider the expressions M 1 = ({E 1 } K , K), M 2 = ({E 2 } K , K ) (without loss of generality, assume K does not occur in E 1 , E 2 ). M 1 ∼ = M 2 , so by the com-
is non-negligible. We use B to construct a WKA-EXP-(E 1 , E 2 ) test A for Π.
where the second equality is due to the definition of A, and the third due to the definition of Sample Π [η] . It follows that A is a weak key-authenticity test for E 1 , E 2 , as required. This completes the necessity part of the proof. Next, we sketch the sufficiency part; a complete proof appears in [HG03] .
, we consider an algorithm that simultaneously parses its input e, a sample from either [ 
and expressions E 1 , E 2 , attempting to construct ϕ, σ that bear witness to the equivalence of the expressions. By the assumption, this attempt is bound to fail. We show that upon failure, the algorithm has enough parsed information to predict the origin of the sample with a non-negligible probability of success. In some cases, the prediction depends on an application of a weak key-authenticity test for (particular, fixed) expressions to the amassed information.
Specifically, the algorithm computes the powers of the operator O E1,E2,e , defined in Fig. 1 (where S = V E1 × V E2 × {0, 1} * ), as long as they satisfy the predicate TEST, also of Fig. 1. Let 
v1 is labelled (M, N ) and has a left child u1 in TE 1 , v2 is labelled (M , N ) and has a left child u2 in TE 2 and x is of the form y, z, "pair" ; or (c) ∃(v1, v2, x) ∈ A such that:
v1 is labelled (M, N ) and has a right child u1 in TE 1 , v2 is labelled (M , N ) and has a right child u2 in TE 2 and x is of the form y, z, "pair" ; or (d) ∃(v1, v2, x) ∈ A and ∃(w1, w2, z) ∈ A such that:
v1 is labelled {M }K and has a child u1 in TE 1 , v2 is labelled {M } K and has a child u2 in TE 2 , x is of the form c, "ciphertext" , w1 is labelled K, w2 is labelled K , z is of the form k, "key" and y = D k (c).
(a) v1 is labelled with b ∈ Bits and v2 is labelled b; or (b) v1 is labelled K, v2 is labelled K and for all (u1, u2, y) ∈ A, u1 is labelled K iff u2 is labelled K ; or (c) v1 is labelled (M, N ) and v2 is labelled (M , N ) ; or (d) v1 is labelled {M }K , v2 is labelled {M } K and for all (u1, u2, y) ∈ A, u1 is labelled K iff u2 is labelled K . false otherwise. 
, R E1 , and R E2 ). If TEST does not fail by the max(|E 1 | , |E 2 |)'s power of O E1,E2,e , V E1 , V E2 achieve the sets of reachable nodes of T E1 , T E2 , respectively, by the first point above, and so E 1 ∼ = E 2 by the second point, contradicting our assumption. We conclude that TEST must fail on some lower power of O E1,E2,e ; let i * ∈ N be the lowest such power.
We use O i * E1,E2,e to make a prediction, based on the reason TEST fails. Here, we illustrate a case that calls for the use of a weak key-authenticity test for expressions. Assume TEST fails because there exist (v 1 , v 2 , x), (u 1 , u 2 , y) ∈ O i * E1,E2,e such that v 1 is labelled {M } K , u 1 is labelled K, v 2 is labelled {M } K , and u 2 is labelled K . An inductive argument on the powers of our operator shows that x, y are the sampling labels of either v 1 , u 1 , respectively, or v 2 , u 2 , respectively, depending on the origin of e. Let x = c, "ciphertext" , y = k, "key" . In the first case, c is an encryption of a sample from [[M ] ] Π(η) with the key k; in the second case, c is an encryption of a sample from [[M ] ] Π(η) with some key, and k is a random key. The WKA-EXP-(M,M') test on c and k distinguishes these cases with a noticeable probability of success.
Finally, we show that the procedure is efficient. This completes the sketch of the sufficiency part of the proof.
How the Notion of Weak Key-Authenticity Relates to
Other Cryptographic Notions
In this section, we strengthen the notion of the admittance of weak key authenticity tests for expressions. We consider the admittance of a single, all-purpose test, hereby referred to as the weak key-authenticity test, that distinguishes any ciphertext and the key it was encrypted with from any ciphertext and a random key, with a non-negligible probability; the test is defined in terms that are independent of the formal language of the preceding sections. We compare the strengthened version with the notions of confusion-freedom and authenticated encryption, previously discussed in the literature in the context of the completeness result [MW02, AJ01] . Specifically, we show that the requirement that an encryption scheme admits a weak key-authenticity test is strictly weaker than the requirement that it be confusion-free, as defined in the above references (which, in turn, is enough to show it is strictly weaker than authenticated encryption as well). To that effect, we present an encryption scheme that admits a weak key-authenticity test but is not confusion-free. The scheme we present is also Type-0. It therefore satisfies the soundness criteria of [AR02] , our completeness criteria, but not the previous completeness criteria of [MW02] . The notions we present and the methods used to achieve the admittance of a weak key-authenticity test should be of independent interest. Informally, confusion-freedom captures the ability of a decryption algorithm to distinguish a ciphertext and the key it was encrypted with from a ciphertext and a random key with almost full certainty. In contrast, the weak keyauthenticity test is required to distinguish the two with merely a noticeable probability. We will separate the notions in a strong sense, pertaining directly to the gap in their required distinguishing certainties (as opposed to pertaining to the placement of the distinguisher-inside or outside the decryption algorithm).
First, we give formal definitions for the notions at hand. Confusion-freedom is defined as it appears in the completeness result of [MW02] ; our proofs can be modified to accommodate the version of [AJ01] too. 
We say that Π is confusion-free (CF for short) if for any 1 ≤ i ≤ l, Adv
is negligible (as a function of η).
Next, we define two auxiliary notions that will enable us to focus on the the above-mentioned gap. These will provide a "middle ground" for comparing the WKA-EXP test with CF.
Definition 5.2 (Strong Key-Authenticity Test, Weak Key-Authenticity Test). Let Π = (K, E, D) be an encryption scheme, η ∈ N a security parameter. Let P 1 , P 2 (hereby referred to as plaintext generators) be probabilistic algorithms that take a security parameter η (provided in unary), and for sufficiently large η always return a x ∈ Plain Π[η] ; we write x R ← P j (1 η ) for j ∈ {1, 2}, thinking of x as being drawn from the probability distribution induced by P j (1 η ) on {0, 1} * . Let A be an algorithm. Define:
where tst ∈ {ska, wka}. We say that Π admits a strong (resp., weak ) keyauthenticity test, SKA (resp., WKA) for short, if there exists a probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithm A such that for all probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithms P 1 , P 2 , Adv
) is negligibly close to 1 (resp., is non-negligible) as a function of η.
As for the definition of integrity of plaintext security (INT-PTXT for short), a flavor of authenticated encryption, we refer the reader to [BN00,KY00] and to [MW02] .
The following diagram depicts relationships between our notions of interest.
In the above, A −→ B means that an encryption scheme that meets notion A must also meet notion B; we call such a relationship an implication. A −→ B means that an encryption scheme that meets notion A does not necessarily meet notion B; we call such a relationship a separation.
The implications in the diagram are mostly straightforward (see [HG03] ). The rest of the section is devoted to the separation of WKA from SKA. To that end, we show an encryption scheme that admits a WKA test but does not admit an SKA test. We use a standard construction based on a pseudorandom function family, with an added "weak redundancy". To simplify the exposition, we use a single, constant bit as redundancy; refer to the end of the section for a generalization.
Let F be a pseudorandom family of functions with a security parameter η ∈ N, key domain {0, 1}
η , domain {0, 1} l(η) and range {0, 1} L(η) (where l, L are polynomials in η); let be a negligible function such that Adv prf F [η] (A) ≤ (η) for any probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithm A. We use x 1 x 2 · · · x m to denote the individual bits of a string x ∈ {0, 1} m . We use • to denote the concatenation operator on strings of bits, ⊕ to denote the bitwise XOR operator on strings of bits of equal length.
Define an encryption scheme Π * = (K * , E * , D * ) with a security parameter η ∈ N as follows:
Note that Plain Π * [η] = {0, 1} L(η)−1 . Also note that E * and D * can deduce η from k (η = |k|). Π * can easily be shown to be IND-CPA secure based on the pseudorandomness of F . For a proof, see [GG86] , or simply think of Π * as a degenerate version of the randomized CTR mode, and rely on [BD97] . Using the results of [AR02] , it can further be shown to be Type-0.
We have that:
Theorem 5.3. Π * admits a WKA test.
To see this, consider an algorithm that takes as input y, r and k, computes y ⊕ F k (r) and outputs 1 iff the last bit of the outcome is 1. The algorithm is a WKA test for Π * by a simple reduction to the pseudorandomness of F (see [HG03] ). In addition, we have that:
Theorem 5.4. Π * does not admit an SKA test.
Proof. Let A be a probabilistic algorithm that runs in time t, a function of the size of its input. Let A(a 1 , a 2 , . . . ; w) denote the outcome of running A on inputs a 1 , a 2 , . . . and randomness w. Note that the length of w is bounded by t. Let U be an algorithm that takes η ∈ N (in unary) as input and outputs a random, uniformly-selected element of {0, 1} L(η)−1 . We have: where t is a polynomial in η.
Let S 1 and A 1 ⊆ S 1 denote the sample space and event, respectively, depicted by the first term above. Let S 2 and A 2 ⊆ S 2 be defined similarly with respect to the second term.
Let (x 0 , k 0 , r 0 , w 0 ) ∈ A 1 . Note that for any k ∈ {0, 1} η , if there exists an
x ∈ {0, 1} L(η)−1 such that (x • 1) ⊕ F k (r 0 ) = (x 0 • 1) ⊕ F k0 (r 0 ), then it must be the case that (x, k, k 0 , r 0 , w 0 ) ∈ A 2 (because in this case, A, in the second experiment, runs on the same input and randomness as in the first experiment). This happens when x • 1 = (x 0 • 1) ⊕ F k0 (r 0 ) ⊕ F k (r 0 ), which must happen for at least 1 2 − (η) · 2 η of the keys k ∈ {0, 1} η ; otherwise, an adversary that queries its oracle on r 0 , XORs the answer with (x 0 • 1) and with F k0 (r 0 ), and outputs 1 if the last bit of the result is different than 1, 0 otherwise-breaks the pseudorandomness of F .
For a given (x 0 , k 0 , r 0 , w 0 ) ∈ A 1 , we've just described a way of counting at least 1 2 − (η) · 2 η tuples in A 2 . We would like to argue that for a distinct (x 1 , k 1 , r 1 , w 1 ) ∈ A 1 , we would be counting different tuples in A 2 by employing the same method. This is clear if k 1 = k 0 or r 1 = r 0 or w 1 = w 0 . As for the case that k 1 = k 0 , r 1 = r 0 , w 1 = w 0 , we would be double-counting a tuple iff
which happens iff x 1 = x 0 .
We conclude that |A 2 | ≥ Finally, we note that our construction can be easily generalized to one that admits a WKA test with an advantage as small as desired, as follows. For any c ∈ N + , let Π
